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It is my proposal that future cognitive science needs to be developed in the context of a general 
scientific world-view that is based upon contemporary physics.  It is within such a general world-
view that the special sciences studying the mind (psychology, AI, neuroscience etc.) need to find 
their proper place, and will hopefully find new avenues for progress when doing so. One research 
programme which has attempted to articulate such a new worldview is due to the physicists David 
Bohm and Basil Hiley.  They have developed both a general “implicate order” framework as well 
as a more specific “ontological interpretation” of quantum theory.  Both schemes involve radically 
new ideas and concepts, which also promise to open up new possibilities for understanding the place 
of cognition and consciousness in nature.  
Introduction
One question that has been underlying my 
research is what kinds of assumptions about 
the nature of the physical world there are in 
cognitive science and how such assumptions 
might reveal themselves in the theories pro-
posed in cognitive science. For example, the 
traditional view of cognition as mechanical 
symbol manipulation is very much in har-
mony with the spirit of classical physics, for 
manipulable symbols are typical things of 
the macro world. Also, connectionism and 
dynamical systems theory often employ mod-
els relying on differential equations that are 
deterministic and are in this sense developed 
in the spirit of classical physics. However, 
it is not at all obvious that central aspects of 
human cognition – such as creative insight or 
conscious experience – are phenomena which 
can be explained in terms of mechanistic 
computation or dynamic evolution embedded 
in a classical physics framework. 
Physics has changed radically in the course 
of the 20th century, and these changes imply 
the need to change our overall scientific 
worldview. Such changes in the general 
worldview in turn usually imply the need to 
rethink the nature and status of more specific 
theories, such as those central in cognitive 
science. In particular, and as already hinted 
above, one needs to ask to what extent cogni-
tive science presupposes the worldview of 
classical physics, and how this may influence 
its theories. Further, one can ask whether it is 
justified to rely on classical physics assump-
tions as fundamental, given that physics itself 
has given up classical physics as fundamen-
tal and sees it instead as a limiting case or 
as a framework that only works in a given 
domain. And finally, the interesting question 
is whether we might be able to explain and 
understand the features of the mind – and 
especially its relation to matter - better in a 
framework that is based upon the new, more 
accurate developments in physics.
It is my proposal that the future cognitive 
science needs to be developed in the context 
of a general scientific worldview that is based 
upon contemporary physics. It is within 
such a general worldview that the special 
sciences studying the mind (psychology, AI, 
neuroscience etc.) need to find their proper 
place, and will hopefully find new avenues 
for progress when doing so. One research 
programme which has attempted to articulate 
such a new worldview is due to the physicists 
David Bohm and Basil Hiley. They have 
developed both a general “implicate order” 
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framework as well as a more specific “on-
tological interpretation” of quantum theory. 
Both schemes involve radically new ideas 
and concepts, which also promise to open up 
new possibilities for understanding the place 
of cognition and consciousness in nature. 
Within philosophy, a particularly intense 
attempt to develop a new worldview has in 
recent years been made by James Ladyman 
and Don Ross in their 2007 book Every 
Thing Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized. 
In this article I will briefly describe some key 
features of these research programmes and 
sketch tentatively how they might change our 
picture of cognition in the future.
Getting clear about quantum 
theory: the ontological 
interpretation
Let us first see what cognitive science might 
learn from Bohm and Hiley’s ontological 
interpretation of the quantum theory (for an 
extensive presentation see, Bohm & Hiley 
1993).  For our present purposes what is par-
ticularly interesting about this interpretation 
is that it suggests that something analogous to 
information plays an active role at the level of 
fundamental quantum processes. Bohm him-
self felt that this idea of active information is 
relevant to broader philosophical issues, such 
as the relationship between mind and matter 
(Bohm 1990). To understand this suggestion 
better let us briefly consider the ontological 
interpretation of quantum theory.
When quantum theory was first interpreted 
in the 1920s, it was typically assumed that 
individual quantum processes (e.g. the de-
cay of a radioactive atom) are inherently 
indeterministic, and that it is not possible 
to provide an unambiguous model of a 
single quantum system, such as an electron. 
Instead, it was either said that we must not 
try to picture the electron at all, or else that 
we in some situations may describe it as a 
wave, and in others as a particle (this is the 
mysterious “wave-particle duality”). Since 
the 1920s, there were also critics such as 
Einstein who felt that a fuller and possibly 
more deterministic description should be 
possible. A significant suggestion to this 
direction was made by Louis deBroglie in 
1925 and especially by David Bohm, who 
in 1952-inspired by his many discussions 
with Einstein-re-discovered independently 
deBroglie’s earlier approach and gave a fuller 
and more coherent presentation of it. 
Although initially almost ignored, the 
deBroglie-Bohm approach has received in-
creasing attention and approval in recent 
decades, due to the efforts of such leading 
physicists and philosophers as John Bell, 
David Albert, Sheldon Goldstein, Antony 
Valentini, James Cushing, Arthur Fine, and 
Hilary Putnam (see Goldstein 2009, which 
includes a historical discussion and also con-
siders the criticisms against the approach).
What is potentially particularly important 
for the future of cognitive science is Bohm’s 
and his long-time colleague Basil Hiley’s 
extension of Bohm’s original 1952 onto-
logical interpretation. According to the usual 
interpretation of the quantum theory the wave 
function is often said to describe not a quan-
tum system directly but rather our knowledge 
of the quantum system to be observed (typi-
cally in terms of probabilities). In contrast, 
Bohm and Hiley were suggesting that the 
wave function describes an objectively real 
field, guiding a particle such as an electron. 
As a new development, they were drawing 
attention to the striking fact that according 
to the mathematical description favored by 
Bohm, this field does not push and pull the 
particle mechanically, but rather it is only the 
form (second spatial derivative) of the field 
that determines its effect on the particle. They 
suggested that what is going on is that the 
quantum field encodes information about the 
whole environment of the particle (e.g. slits) 
– the field literally in-forms or puts form into 
the motion of the particle. 
The proposal is radical, for they are in ef-
fect suggesting that this type of information 
ought to be acknowledged as a fundamental 
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– perhaps the fundamental – category of 
physics. Indeed, they wrote in 1983: “The 
notion of a particle responding actively to 
information in the [quantum] field is … far 
more subtle and dynamic than any others that 
have hitherto been supposed to be fundamen-
tal in physics” (Bohm & Hiley 1983).
In my view Bohm and Hiley’s proposal 
is potentially very important to cognitive 
science which likewise sees information, 
and information processing, as its central 
notions. Bohm himself pointed out that the 
way information acts at the quantum level is 
at least closely analogous to the way infor-
mation acts in human subjective experience. 
When I see something that means “danger” 
(e.g. a snake), the information content acts 
within the brain, not only via electric action 
potentials, but also via various neurochemical 
processes to prepare the body for an appropri-
ate response (cf. Thagard 2002). 
Bohm and Hiley’s approach opens up 
a whole new way of understanding such 
“psycho-somatic” processes. The idea here 
is that abstract information content is some-
thing intrinsically active and intrinsically 
able to cause changes in the more concrete 
underlying physical aspects of the system 
in question. This differs in interesting ways 
from the more standard, passive notions of 
information typically used in the standard ac-
counts currently on offer in cognitive science 
(i.e. symbolic processing, neural networks, 
and dynamical systems). In my view, Bohm 
and Hiley’s notion of active information 
can capture more adequately what is taking 
place in actual cognitive processes that the 
standard accounts. 
Bohm and Hiley suggest that information 
plays an active role at various levels, psy-
chological, biological and even the quantum. 
What are the reasons for assuming that the 
notion of active information applies all the 
way to the quantum level? Importantly, this 
assumption enables one to understand such 
otherwise paradoxical quantum features as 
wave-particle duality, non-locality, and the 
multidimensionality of the many-body wave 
function. (It is characteristic of quantum 
theory that every interpretation needs to make 
some strange assumption(s), and then tries to 
avoid some even more unsatisfactory features 
with the help of this assumption. This is one 
way of trying to make sense of something 
very weird.) Information is here seen as an 
objective commodity that actively guides the 
particle - it is information for the electron 
rather than information for human beings. 
Fred Dretske had similarly emphasized in 
1981 that information should be seen as an 
objective commodity, although his notion of 
information is in some key ways different 
from Bohm and Hiley’s.
I should note that Bohm and Hiley’s pro-
posal about the quantum theoretical active 
information is controversial and still mostly 
ignored within the physics community. There 
are some technical issues with the proposal, 
but in my view a major reason is that it goes 
so much against the prevalent mechanistic 
way of thinking in physics. However, some 
leading thinkers do take it seriously, for 
example Quentin Smith (2003).
Bohm and Hiley see the existence and 
role of information at the quantum level as 
an instance of a more general principle of 
active information that prevails in various 
levels of nature. For example, it is commonly 
accepted that the DNA molecule encodes 
information that guides the growth of an 
organism; likewise information in a com-
puter can guide a wide range of activities; 
and also, as we already mentioned above, 
information in human subjective experience 
(for example when we interpret some form 
to mean “danger”) can give rise to powerful 
psychosomatic activities. 
Bohm was keen to point out the potential 
relevance of the active information idea to 
traditional puzzles about the place of mean-
ing and mind in nature. In these traditional 
puzzles it is typically presupposed that the 
physical world is different from phenomena 
such as meaning and mental properties, thus 
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giving rise to a dualism. By extending a kind 
of meaning (as active information) all the 
way to the (currently) fundamental laws of 
quantum theory, Bohm saw a possibility of 
transcending the dualism prevalent in much 
of Western philosophy and culture more 
generally.
In Bohm’s proposal we have a more subtle 
aspect (information in the quantum field) 
guiding the behaviour of a more manifest 
aspect (the particle). We could generalize 
this to a principle that applies whenever 
meaning influences matter in other contexts. 
Bohm proposed such a principle and called 
it “soma-significance”. In this terminology a 
process in which meaning acts somatically to 
organize the more manifest levels of matter 
is called a “signa-somatic” process. The term 
“soma-significant” refers to the inverse proc-
ess, where a physical pattern is significant to 
a higher or more subtle level (e.g. when one 
is reading a text, the information is carried 
by different physical processes (ink, light 
waves, neural processes) to higher levels of 
physical organization where its meaning is 
apprehended). Bohm (2003) characterizes 
our existence as a “two-way movement” as 
follows:
We emphasize here that nothing exists 
in this process of soma-significance, 
except as a two-way movement between 
the aspects of soma and significance, as 
well as between levels that are relati-
vely subtle and those that are relatively 
manifest. It is this over-all structure of 
meaning … that is grasped in every 
experience.
He (2003) further illustrates the same point:
From each level of somatic unfoldment 
of meaning, there is … a further move-
ment leading to activity on to a yet more 
manifestly somatic level, until the action 
finally emerges as a physical movement 
of the body that affects the environment. 
So one can say that there is a two-way 
movement of energy, in which each level 
of significance acts on the next more 
manifestly somatic level and so on, while 
perception carries the meaning of the 
action back in the other direction.
Such two-way traffic between the mental 
and the physical is what we need for mental 
causation. Bohm assumes that each level has 
both a physical and mental aspect, and hopes 
this way to avoid the problem of dualism (i.e. 
the problem of explaining how a non-physical 
level could possibly interact with a physical 
level). The idea is that mental processes are 
carried by subtle physical processes, perhaps 
fields that are analogous to, but more complex 
than the quantum field. But how could such 
a “very subtle” field carrying information 
possibly be able to act upon the more mani-
fest processes e.g. in the motor cortex? One 
possibility is that it would act via the quantum 
field. Indeed, Bohm (1990) writes: 
…that which we experience as mind, in 
its movement through various levels of 
subtlety, will, in a natural way ultima-
tely move the body by reaching to the 
level of the quantum potential and of 
the ‘dance’ of the particles. There is no 
unbridgeable gap or barrier between 
any of these levels. Rather, at each 
stage some kind of information is the 
bridge. This implies that the quantum 
potential acting on atomic particles, 
for example, represents only one stage 
in the process.
It seems to me that Bohm assumes that the 
more subtle aspects of mind and conscious 
experience involve more subtle levels of 
information, which have not yet been dis-
covered by the “3rd person” methods of 
cognitive neuroscience (although we are 
aware of at least some of them via our “1st 
person” introspection). The discovery of 
the quantum potential is very important as 
a first guide (prototype) to what the nature 
of such more subtle levels could be from the 
physical side. Indeed, Bohm suggested that 
by extending the ontological interpretation 
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in a natural way, we could include the subtle 
mental aspects into the theory. But how can 
such an extension be done?
… one could begin by supposing, for 
example, that as the quantum poten-
tial constitutes active information that 
can give form to the movements of the 
particles, so there is a superquantum 
potential that can give form to the unfold-
ment and development of this first order 
quantum potential. This latter would no 
longer satisfy the laws of the current 
quantum theory, which latter would then 
be an approximation, working only when 
the action of the superquantum potential 
can be neglected. Of course, there is no 
reason to stop here. One could go on to 
suppose a series of orders of superquan-
tum potentials, with each order consti-
tuting information that gives form to the 
activity of the next lower order (which 
is less subtle) (Bohm 1990).
Bohm’s radical suggestion thus is that a 
natural extension of his ontological inter-
pretation of the quantum theory can include 
mental processes and even conscious ex-
perience into a single coherent view. From 
the point of view of the question about the 
causal powers of mental properties Bohm’s 
view is particularly promising, for it makes 
it-at least in principle–possible to understand 
how mental properties, via their effects upon 
information at lower levels, could make a dif-
ference to physical process. If we can provide 
an intelligible theory about how mental prop-
erties can make a difference to information 
at lower levels, Bohm’s scheme provides a 
view of how such informational differences 
can then affect manifest physical processes 
(see also Hiley & Pylkkänen 2005).
Toward a more general worldview: 
the implicate order
It is commonly agreed that the hardest prob-
lem in contemporary physics is the unification 
of quantum theory and general relativity. 
Bohm and Hiley’s ontological interpretation 
of quantum theory, briefly described above, 
provides some insights that may be useful 
in this endeavour (for example, it is temp-
ting to interpret Bohmian trajectories at the 
quantum level as geodesics, in some ways 
analogous to general relativistic concepts). 
However, one could also argue that the 
ontological interpretation, especially with 
its emphasis on non-locality, helps to bring 
the tension between quantum theory and 
general relativity into a sharper focus, rather 
than resolving it. Many physicists agree that 
something radically new is needed in physics 
if that tension is to be resolved (string theory 
and quantum loop gravity are well-known 
contemporary attempts to do this). Bohm 
started to develop his own general sche-
me–known as the “implicate order”–in the 
early 1960s, and was soon joined by Basil 
Hiley in this project. 
Adopting this more general approach does 
not mean that one discards the ontological 
interpretation of quantum theory as useless. 
The ontological interpretation can still be 
seen to provide insight into an important 
though limited domain of fundamental phys-
ics, (non-relativistic) quantum theory. But if 
one wants a more general scheme new ideas 
are needed. 
When seeking such a more general scheme, 
Bohm first gave attention to the fact that the 
basic concepts of quantum theory and rela-
tivity seem to be in complete contradiction. 
While relativity requires continuity, deter-
minism and locality, the usual interpretation 
of quantum theory points to discontinuity, 
indeterminism and non-locality. This being 
the case, how could we ever hope to unite 
these two theories? Bohm’s strategy was to 
ask whether there is anything these theories 
have in common. His answer to this question 
was: undivided wholeness. Relativity points 
to this by giving up the notion of particle as 
fundamental, while quantum phenomena 
such as wave-particle duality and non-locality 
clearly underline the status and role of the 
whole over the autonomy of the parts. Bohm 
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felt, however, that our entire scientific and 
philosophical tradition is dominated by what 
he called “mechanistic order”, and this makes 
it difficult to even think about the undivided 
wholeness of quantum and relativistic phe-
nomena. A new “notion of order” is needed, 
and his suggestion was the “implicate” order. 
While in the mechanistic (or “explicate”) 
order things exist outside each other and 
interact mechanically, in the implicate order 
the whole is typically enfolded into each part, 
and each part is enfolded into the whole. 
This is illustrated by light (electromagnetic 
waves). At each point of a room, light waves 
coming from all the other parts of the room 
interfere – in this sense information of the 
whole is enfolded into each region. This 
means also that information about each part 
(e.g. the clock on my table) is present in each 
region of the room, and in this sense each part 
is enfolded in the whole. Similar considera-
tions apply in quantum field theory, which 
describes particles such as electrons in terms 
of fields. We are thus invited to think that the 
implicate order is the fundamental order of 
the universe, while the explicate, mechanistic 
order arises from this under suitable condi-
tions. The implicate order framework thus 
enables us to think of our usual every-day 
physical world as something that constantly 
unfolds from a deeper implicate ground. 
Bohm’s hope was that as the mathematical 
description of the implicate order focuses on 
the common ground of quantum theory and 
relativity (undivided wholeness) it should be 
able to derive these theories as limiting cases 
and approximations without contradictions. 
This research programme was developed by 
Bohm, Hiley, and their research students. It 
has given rise to some promising results, but 
needs further development. 
Bohm was keen to point out that something 
like the implicate order prevails in other phe-
nomena, such as biological, psychological 
(phenomenological, linguistic) and social. 
Let us next consider briefly what relevance 
it might have to cognitive science, espe-
cially the problem of explaining conscious 
experience.
Discussions about the potential relevance 
of the “New Physics” (quantum theory and 
relativity) to explaining consciousness tend 
to focus on the possible role of quantum 
effects in the neural/physical correlate of 
consciousness (see Atmanspacher 2006. 
However, there is another “quantum route” 
to consciousness, which relies on the new 
scientific worldview that the New Physics 
demands. Exactly what that new worldview 
is has been subject to a long debate. As we 
saw above, Bohm and Hiley proposed that 
New Physics requires above all a new notion 
of order. We need to give up as fundamen-
tal the “Cartesian order”, exemplified by 
the Cartesian co-ordinates. Translated into 
physical ontology, this means giving up the 
3+1-D space-time as fundamental. Bohm’s 
proposed new notion is that of the “implicate 
order”. It gives rise to the “Cartesian order” 
as a special case, but also allows a natural 
description of such quantum phenomena as 
non-locality, discontinuity of motion and 
wave-particle duality. 
Most of contemporary cognitive science 
and consciousness studies (cognitive neuro-
science, philosophy of mind, etc.) proceeds 
as if there had not been any revolution in 
physics. Many of these researchers agree 
that conscious experience typically involves 
a “virtual reality” or “world simulation” 
(consider dreams), but tacitly this world is 
understood in terms of Newtonian notions 
of space and time, and thus the “Cartesian 
order”. But what is the order that actually 
prevails in conscious experience? Bohm 
proposed that the notion of implicate order 
that seems necessary to deal with quantum 
phenomena, also captures some essential 
features of conscious experience. The basic 
idea is that the usual “Cartesian world simu-
lation” we typically encounter in conscious 
experience can be seen as a special case of 
a more fundamental implicate order that 
prevails in conscious experience.
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Let me say a little more about how we 
might be able to explain aspects of conscious-
ness in the implicate order framework. One 
of the central features of conscious experi-
ence is its spatio-temporal, phenomenal 
structure (van Gulick 2011). Connected with 
this is the metaphor that consciousness is a 
kind of “virtual reality” associated with the 
brain (e.g. Velmans, Revonsuo, Metzinger, 
Lehar). An adequate theory of consciousness 
thus has to tell a story about how the virtual 
reality of consciousness is created. One place 
to look for inspiration in this endeavour is 
contemporary physics and algebraic geom-
etry. For some physicists such as Wheeler 
and Bohm & Hiley have been led to consider 
how space-time emerges from some deeper 
structure they often call “pre-space”. The 
interesting question is whether the work in 
physics, which describes the ground of the 
“real spatio-temporal reality,” could be use-
ful also when trying to describe the ground 
of the “virtual, phenomenal spatio-temporal 
reality” of consciousness.
Bohm and Hiley (1984) generalized the 
Penrose twistor theory to a Clifford algebra, 
paving the way for a description which al-
lows continuous space-time to emerge from a 
deeper pre-space they call an implicate order. 
Bohm (1986) further proposed that the “ex-
plicate” space and time that we consciously 
experience is likewise projected from its 
enfoldment in deeper implicate orders. In 
neural terms what becomes interesting here 
is Pribram’s (1991) holographic theory of 
neural memory, for the hologram (where 
information about the whole is stored in 
each part) is a paradigmatic example of an 
implicate order (of course, similar ideas have 
been explored in connection with artificial 
neural networks). One of the challenges for 
future research is to develop a more detailed 
account of the spatio-temporal, phenomenal 
structure of consciousness in the implicate 
order framework.
To summarize, the notion of implicate 
order has a number of features that seem to 
make it particularly suitable to explain some 
puzzling features of conscious experience, 
such as its phenomenal structure, unity and 
dynamic flow. First of all, it is possible to 
give a description of how physical space-
time arises in terms of the implicate order. As 
we already mentioned, it might be possible, 
analogously, to provide an explanation of 
the phenomenal, especially spatio-temporal, 
structure of conscious experience in terms of 
the implicate order. Secondly, the implicate 
order captures the undivided wholeness of 
quantum phenomena, and this feature might 
well prove a useful analogue when trying to 
explain the unity of consciousness. Thirdly, 
the implicate order takes movement (as op-
posed to things that move) as fundamental, 
and in this way it is likely to be useful when 
trying to explain the dynamic flow of con-
sciousness. Further, given the possibility that 
the implicate order prevails in both matter and 
in conscious experience, it might also throw 
new light upon the perennial puzzle about the 
relation of matter and consciousness. In my 
2007 book Mind, Matter and the Implicate 
Order, I have discussed the prospects of the 
implicate order as an explanatory framework 
in consciousness studies. In particular, I fo-
cussed upon explaining the temporal structure 
of our conscious experience of listening to 
music (or ”time consciousness”) in terms of 
the implicate order constituted of the indi-
vidual notes (Pylkkänen 2007, ch5).
Ladyman and Ross’s rainforest 
realism
I have above indicated briefly how the vari-
ous ideas emerging from Bohm and Hiley’s 
research programme, primarily developed 
in the context of physics, might also prove 
useful in areas such as cognitive science 
and consciousness studies. This research 
programme invites us to rethink many of 
our basic categories, such as space, time, 
matter, causality and information. These cat-
egories are also central in cognitive science, 
and thus new ways of thinking about them 
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open at least potentially new avenues for 
theorizing in cognitive science. At the same 
time my own feeling is that development 
in this respect can be slow and speculative, 
as one often needs to proceed by analogies. 
Also, attempts to develop general schemes 
of naturalistic metaphysics that are based 
upon contemporary physics have been fairly 
rare in recent philosophy, leaving Bohm and 
Hiley’s research programme fairly isolated 
from other research. A refreshing exception to 
such tendencies in contemporary philosophy 
is James Ladyman and Don Ross’s ambitious 
“rainforest realism”, proposed in their 2007 
book Every Thing Must Go.
Ladyman and Ross (2007) launch an attack 
against contemporary analytic metaphysics 
or ‘neo-scholastic’ metaphysics as they call 
it. According to them, it “contributes nothing 
to human knowledge and, where it has any 
impact at all, systematically misrepresents the 
relative significance of what we do know on 
the basis of science” (p. vii). Their view is no 
doubt an extreme one, but if they are correct, 
this would have important implications for 
consciousness studies. For example, ‘neo-
scholastic’ philosophers of mind typically rely 
on their intuitions when reasoning about the 
place of consciousness in nature, but Lady-
man and Ross remind us that intuitions are 
“the basis for ... everyday practical heuristics 
... they are not cognitive gadgets designed to 
produce systematically worthwhile guidance 
in either science or metaphysics” (p. 10). 
Ladyman and Ross present a naturalized 
metaphysics which aims to unify weakly the 
special sciences by reference to fundamental 
physics. So, for them the key point is uni-
fication, and fundamental physics plays an 
important role in this.  Fundamental phys-
ics is fundamental not because it describes 
some putative fundamental level of reality, 
but because of its generality. Ladyman and 
Ross see it as that part of physics that is 
implicitly tested by every measurement that 
could be taken at any scale of reality and in 
any region of the universe. The unification 
their metaphysics aims for is ‘weak’ because 
it is not reductionist. Because fundamental 
physics by definition applies in all contexts 
it constrains all special sciences (including 
the parts of physics that are not fundamen-
tal). However, trying to describe the world 
in terms of fundamental physics will not 
get us very far. Ontology is scale relative 
in the sense that the “real patterns” that the 
special sciences are trying to capture are not 
detectable at, say, the quantum scale. This 
is why there is no point in trying to reduce 
the patterns studied by chemistry, biology, 
geology, economics etc. into the patterns that 
fundamental physics describes. Ladyman 
and Ross’s view allows for the existence of 
a wide range of things, as long as things are 
understood as real patterns. Their view is 
thus an ontologically rich “rainforest real-
ism”, as opposed to the “desert ontology” 
favoured by Quine.
One of the interesting metaphysical hy-
potheses of Ladyman and Ross proposes that 
there is no fundamental level:
…we … have a … basic problem with 
the idea of a fundamental level, namely, 
its presupposition that reality is struc-
tured into levels in the first place. The 
standard way in which these levels are 
distinguished is according to size. So, 
for example, the domains of different 
special sciences are identified with dif-
ferent scales, the atomic for physics, the 
molecular for chemistry, the cellular for 
biology, and so on. A moment’s reflection 
makes the limitations of this obvious 
since economics can be applied to an 
ant colony or the world economy, and 
evolutionary theory can be applied to 
entities of any size (even, according to 
Smolin … , to the whole universe). Furt-
hermore, in accordance with physics, 
we regard the structure of space and 
the metric used to measure length as 
themselves emergent structures. Hence 
we can hardly treat them as a fundamen-
tal framework within which to describe 
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the levels against which everything else 
exists. (2007: 179)
Note how Ladyman and Ross, like Bohm 
and Hiley, take seriously the idea that physical 
space is an emergent structure, rather than 
a fundamental framework that can just be 
presupposed. These ideas are truly radical 
in relation to traditional Western metaphys-
ics, where individual things in space-time 
are typically assumed to be ontologically 
fundamental.
What is the fate of cognition and con-
sciousness in Ladyman and Ross’s natural-
istic metaphysics? Some hints are provided 
by the following quotes:
Peter Unger … argues that our know-
ledge of the world is purely structural 
and that qualia are the unknowable 
non-structural components of reality. 
On our view, things in themselves and 
qualia are idle wheels in metaphysics… 
(p.154) … If cognitive science concludes 
that mental concepts do not track any 
real patterns then the theory of mind 
will have to go. (p. 254)
However, Ladyman and Ross do not at 
present think that behavioral and cognitive 
sciences are tending in this direction, though 
they think that the folk theory of mind is false 
in all sorts of important ways. They want to 
leave the question open, however, and refer 
to Dennett’s work:
In any given instance, it may be that 
our concepts and intuitions about the 
real patterns we are tracking may be 
widely mistaken, as with intuitions about 
qualia and phenomenal conscious sta-
tes. (p.254)
So it seems that their universe is not very 
consciousness-friendly, even though cogni-
tion and mind in some weaker sense may 
find a place there.
Conclusion
In summary we can note that Ladyman 
and Ross’s project is a refreshing attempt 
develop a world-view implied by contem-
porary physics and the special sciences. 
But for those whose intuitions suggest that 
conscious experience is a real their project 
is frustrating. Of course, as we saw above, 
they remind us that our intuitions may lead 
us astray in science or metaphysics. But for 
many researchers conscious experience is real 
phenomenon, not merely an illusion created 
by old-fashioned intuitions. This leads us 
to ask whether there are other schemes of 
naturalistic metaphysics that are more con-
sciousness-friendly. I suggest that one such 
scheme is Bohm and Hiley’s implicate order 
framework, complemented by the more nar-
row and specific “ontological interpetation” 
of quantum theory that includes the idea of 
active information.
There are many important similarities 
between the research programmes of Lady-
man & Ross (LR) and Bohm & Hiley (BH). 
Neither considers separate objects as funda-
mental, but see structures (LR) or movement 
and order (BH) as primary. Neither assumes 
that there is a fundamental level, and there 
is a similarity between LR’s scale relativity 
of ontology and Bohm’s idea that ontology 
is always relative to context. Further, in both 
schemes causality can be understood in a 
radically new way. The fact that both schemes 
are based upon contemporary physics and 
that they make similar suggestions is a sign 
that they may well be on the right track. (I 
am grateful to Ilkka Pättiniemi (2011) for 
drawing my attention to some similarities 
between LR and BH.)
When it comes to understanding cognition 
and consciousness, it seems to me that Bohm 
and Hiley’s framework is a more liberal 
one. I think history teaches that the study of 
cognition and consciousness has suffered 
from overly verificationist attitudes, as dur-
ing behaviorism. This is why I favor Bohm 
and Hiley’s scheme as a more promising one 
in which to develop specific theories about 
cognition and consciousness in the future. 
But this is not to deny the potential value of 
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Ladyman and Ross’s rainforest realism to 
cognitive science. Perhaps the creative ten-
sion between these similar but yet different 
schemes is just what is needed to give the 
necessary dialectical power needed to push 
theories of cognition and consciousness into 
new domains.
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